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In 2007 the world faced one of the biggest financial crises ever. It was the third important 
financial crisis in the last 12 years. Spillovers to the real economy and moral hazard 
behaviour of carpetbaggers resulted in enormous pressure on worldwide political institutions 
to approve a more rigorous regulation on financial institutions and predict financial crises via 
early warning systems. We analyzed the performance of structured finance ratings and 
structured finance issuance/outstanding to detect the main shortcomings of the subprime 
crisis. Afterwards we explain the behaviour of market participants with theoretical models and 
a survey of institutions involved in securitization. With the conclusions of this analysis we 
evaluate the EU regulation on credit rating agencies and current Basel II enhancements. 
Finally we can determine that most regulatory enhancements are in accordance with our 
analyzed shortcomings. Some approaches like the introduction of a leverage ratio are 
counterproductive and a danger for worldwide economic growth. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Since mid 2007 the world has faced one of the biggest financial crises ever. 
The subprime crisis was the third important financial crisis in the last 12 
years. Due to the very complex and intransparent structure of structured 
finance products and their incalculable systemic relevance, large writedowns 
and ongoing mistrust is inherent in nearly all financial markets until today. 
This mistrust led to a drying-out of important treasury markets like the 
interbank money market or the secondary market. Even with massive bail-
outs (€1.873 billion by mid-October 2008) and enhanced money market 
tender programs (like US-TALF or EU-Repo)  a spillover to the real economy 
could not be avoided but lead to a partial stabilization of international 
financial markets and a temporary decrease of secondary market spreads. 
But as is noted in the CEPS Task Force Report (Lannoo (2008)) there was 
no European response to the crisis and from a national point of view this is 
comprehensible since the impact on European countries has been 
heterogeneous. Even if this crisis was not a European crisis, one of the 
hallmarks of the EU´s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) is questioned: 
disintermediation and therewith securitization which is a very important factor 
for the development of a mature capital market beside the financial 
intermediaries. The integration process of EU financial markets and financial 
intermediaries proceeds much faster than EU regulation and supervision. 
And as it was noted in Lannoo (2008) the EU realized this shortcoming ten 
years ago and reacted, beside of the start of the monetary union and the 
launch of the FSAP, with the implementation of Lamfalussy Committee 
proposals. But even if this reform brought some remarkable results, it was 
crafted during good market conditions and seems not to be capable of stormy 
times. More and more experts got the result that we have probably reached 
the limits of what is possible under the current system and that we need a 
major step in EU wide financial regulation and supervision reform. Also the 
politicians are under pressure to adopt a stronger banking regulation and 
foresee crises with early warning systems. We want to analyze the previous 
literature about early warning systems and especially have a look at the 
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developments for major structured finance markets in the last two crises. By 
documentation of the major shortcomings in the present regulatory 
framework which especially stand out through the last two years of financial 
distress we evaluate actual regulatory approaches and show the 
consequences for the world economy. In chapter two we define financial 
market stability and give a short literature review about early warning 
systems for financial crises. In chapter three we show in detail the rating 
behavior of US and European structured finance instruments and detect 
stylized rating facts. Afterwards we explore the US structured finance 
issuance and outstanding to detect possible moral hazard intentions that 
could be prevented through new regulatory approaches. In chapter four we 
take the findings of chapter two and three and try to find the motivation for 
the behavior of market participants to originate and invest in structured 
finance instruments. We do this with the Bearingpoint securitization survey 
(2009) and with theoretic economic approaches. In chapter five we 
summarize the findings of the three former chapters and evaluate the actual 
EU regulation on credit rating agencies, Basel II enhancements and the 
Basel III consultation paper to differentiate between necessary regulations 
and possible overregulation. 
2. Financial market stability and early warning 
systems for financial crises 
 
Before we start discussing the possibility of an early warning system to 
prevent financial crises it is useful to define financial market stability. We will 
do this by the negative proof. DeBandt and Hartmann (2002) define a 
“systemic crisis” as occurring when a shock affects “a considerable number 
of financial institutions or markets […], thereby severely impairing the general 
well-functioning (of an important part) of the financial system. The well 
functioning of the financial system relates to the effectiveness and efficiency 
with which savings are channeled into the real investments promising the 
highest returns. Financial market instability is inherent if major losses are 
realized during a short time period and if central money markets, like the 
interbank market, shut down and if systemic important banks struggle”.  
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In the last 15 years the world mentioned three major financial crises. In 1998 
the financial markets were shocked through the collapse of the hedge fund 
LTCM. Like often in financial crises the central bank, in this case the Federal 
Reserve, organized a $3.5 billion rescue package to prevent a more 
damaging spillover to systemic important banks and therewith at least also to 
the real economy. Only three years later, in 2001, the financial distress was 
due to the “dot-com bubble”.  
 
Figure 1: Performance of the Nasdaq Composite Index based on calculations of Yahoo Finance 
An incredible overheating of stock markets related to an incredible growth in 
the internet sector and related business. 
After both crises the world economy slowly recovered and with initiatives like 
the rework of Basel I there were also initiatives to make the banking system 
less sensitive to financial crises. In 2007 the “subprime crises” appeared and 
is the most intense crisis since the Great Depression. Of course after every 
crisis there were impulsive actions to develop “early warning systems” 
consisting of lots of financial indicators to forecast future financial crises. 
Before we present a short literature review have a look at figure 1. Figure 1 
shows the development of the Nasdaq Composite Index between 1994 and 
2010. Three crisis, three different reactions of the Nasdaq. This should give 
us a first indication that every crisis is different and that it is very difficult to 
forecast financial crises. It is supported by Borio and Drehmann (2009) who 
noted that the construction of reliable quantitative tools to inform 
assessments of the build-up of risk in the financial system has proved 
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elusive. Davis (1995, 1999, 2002) mentioned that some features are common 
to all crises. Borio and Lowe (2002a,b) tested  a lot of indicators focusing on 
the behavior of credit and asset prices. The in sample performance was quite 
good but has just limited advantages. Only if the same indicators perform as 
well out of sample they can be considered to indicate systematic risk. Borio 
and Drehmann (2009) tested the out of sample performance of the indicators 
to the subprime crisis but without special indicators for securitization. Barrel 
et al. (2009) used an early warning system with measures of bank capital and 
liquidity adequacy and of property price growth. They showed that they 
outperform traditional variables such as GDP growth, inflation and real 
interest rates. Davis and Karim (2008) used logit and binomial tree 
approaches that have been successful in predicting banking crises (Karim 
(2008)). Overall, the different early warning systems were just partially helpful 
to predict the subprime crisis. It shows that the sub-prime crisis was different 
compared to other crises and makes regulation even more difficult.  
The challenge of this paper is to analyze the behavior of structured finance 
rating movements, issuance and outstanding. We want to detect stylized 
facts and reasons for the subprime crisis to evaluate actual regulatory 
approaches and show possible early warning indicators. 
3. Stylized facts from structured finance rating 
behavior and issuance 
As noted in Loeffler (2004) rating agencies are important for the stability of 
financial markets. Ratings are used to price risky debt, to compute economic 
and regulatory capital, or to calibrate internal ratings of banks. Ratings should 
give an orientation for default probabilities of the rated assets. They should 
be stable and assign the same default probability over all asset classes. But 
is this also true for financial innovations like structured finance instruments? 
3.1 Structured finance ratings 
It is important to understand that every structured finance product is just as 
good as the underlying assets. To understand the major losses due to 
structured finance products one step is to analyze if the ratings indeed 
correlate with the expected default probabilities for each rating category. 
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Standard and Poor´s (2010) calculated the Gini coefficients for different 
structured finance products. The higher the Gini coefficient the greater is the 
correlation between the ratings and the structured finance instruments default 
behavior. As can be seen in the next chart the Gini coefficients were in the 
90% area for each product before 2006 which is a good indicator that the 
ratings matched the expected defaults. 
 
  Figure 2: Based on calculations of S&P (2010) 
 
The three financial crises (LTCM collapse, „dot com“ bubble, subprime crisis) 
marked in the chart led to lower Gini coefficients. But the decrease of the Gini 
coefficient due to the last crisis led to significant downturns. Especially the 
decrease of the Gini coefficient for CDOs to 15% in 2008 questions the 
ratings methodology. This has direct application to the financial market 
stability because the whole financial system (especially Basel II, rating 
trigger) is related to ratings. If the ratings expected default probability differs 
from the realized defaults enormous consequences for the whole financial 
system and its stability have to be considered. Ratings are based on a 
statistical database that no market participant could have in this detail.  If 
market participants do not trust in ratings or in rating agencies they will 
reduce their interaction with market participants (see also chapter 4). After 
this first indication we want to analyze the rating transition behavior for 
structured finance instruments since the year 2000. 
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3.2 Structured finance ratings transition 
As estimated by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee (2001, 2003, 
2008) the US expansion ended in March 2001. After just eight months the 
trough marks the end of the recession and introduced an expansion of the 
US economy which last until December 2007. We should keep these 
business cycle facts in mind if we analyze the rating behavior. 
Normally rating agencies use through-the-cycle ratings (Altman and Rijken 
(2005)) that are more resistant against business cycle fluctuations. Therewith 
we should expect nearly constant up- and downgrade probabilities for all 
rated financial instruments. Of course during an economic downturn there are 
more downgrades but they should not exceed a threshold value.  But if you 
have a look at the downgrade frequency of Standard & Poor´s global 
structured finance ratings (S&P (2010)) we see in 2008 and 2009 two outliers 
with 38% and 54% that raise again the question if the rating methodology for 
structured finance instruments is correct.  
In general we can determine that the structured finance ratings reacted in 
average with a one or two year lag in downgrades to the recession. As a 
crises threshold value we define in dependence on Fitch (2010) a 10 % 
downgrade rate. This threshold is based on the historical rating changes 
statistic for global financial institutions. A downgrade rate higher than 10% 
shows an extreme economic downturn. Another reason is that the rating 
methodology for corporates and corporate bonds is validated. Therewith an 
extreme exceeding of the 10% threshold in combination with a high spread 
between structured finance and corporate downgrades provides evidence 
that the structured finance rating methodology is inappropriate, i.e. a 
corporate “AAA” is not equivalent to a structured finance “AAA”. After this 
global structured finance rating overview we want to analyze the structured 
finance rating transition for the USA and Europe in more detail. 
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3.2.1 USA 
 
Figure 3: Based on calculations of S&P (2010) 
 
The defined 10% threshold is violated in 2002/2003 with massive 
downgrades of US ABS and US Single-Name Synthetics. These downgrades 
are explainable through the “dot com” bubble, which was an economic crisis 
of the tertiary sector. The companies needed a lot of liquidity and the 
investors who provided liquidity wanted protection through single-name 
synthetics. As the bubble imploded the quality of the underlying deteriorate 
and therewith the single-name synthetics. A spillover to other sectors of the 
real economy, the rise of unemployment involved from 3.9% (Q4/2000) to 
6.1% (Q3/2003), the 9/11 shock and the amazing advance in prices for crude 
oil beginning afterwards explain the weak performance of ABS underlyings  
leading to a 20% downgrade rate in 2003. As a first result we can determine: 
 The performance of structured finance instruments depends 
enormous on the performance of the underlying assets. The time 
lag in downgrades depends on the economic crisis, the strength 
and the range of the shock. 
 The structured finance ratings reacted much stronger in the 
subprime crisis compared to the „dot com“ bubble. 
 Equivalent rating categories (e.g. “AAA”) for complex structured 
finance products, e.g. CDO², and for standard products like 
corporate bonds lead to an underestimation of the risk inherent 
in the structured financial instrument. 
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 Structured finance ratings are more volatile and just limited 
comparable to ratings of other asset classes. 
 
At the beginning of the subprime crisis the most structured finance ratings 
stayed constant. The US CDOs and the US RMBS were even in 2007 
massively downgraded. The US RMBS downgrades are related to the 
underlying mortgages that have floating interest components. Especially the 
large increase of the US Federal Funds rate starting in January 2005 led to 
an increasing default rate of US residential mortgages. The increase in CDO 
downgrades is explainable with CDOs with MBS as underlying also called 
resecuritisations. With the deterioration of the US economy the situation for 
US mortgage owners got worse and the downgrades for US RMBS and US 
CDOs increased in an unprecedented manner.  The deterioration of the US 
economy led also to a decline of commercial real estate demand and 
therewith automatically to higher default rates in commercial mortgages 
resulting in higher downgrade rates. The commercial mortgage market 
seems to be more robust, explaining the one year lag in downgrades 
compared to US RMBS. One reason could be that corporates have higher 
reserves and could withstand economic downturns for a longer period.  
Let us have a look to the US structured finance ratings in more detail.  
 
Figure 4: Based on calculations of S&P (2010) 
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In figure 4 we compare the US structured finance downgrade averages. The 
2000-2003 average covers the “dot com” bubble. The 2004-2006 average 
shows an average for a period with good economic conditions and the 2007-
2009 average describes the average for the subprime crisis. For US ABS the 
2007-2009 average is nearly on the same level as for the period of 2000-
2003. This gives us an indication that the US ABS were not hit harder in the 
subprime crisis than in the economic downturn in 2001. In contrast the US 
RMBS have very low downgrade rates between 2000 and 2006. In average 
there is no statistical significant difference of the 2000-2003 and the 2004-
2006 average. But the 2007-2009 downgrade average marks the all time 
high for downturns. We can conclude: 
 Structured finance ratings are not able to predict financial crises 
because ratings react with a time lag. The downgrade average of 
US RMBS between 2000-2006 gives no indication for the crisis. 
Important systemic assumptions of structured finance rating 
methodologies are wrong (e.g. correlation). 
 Long term structured finance ratings are highly volatile and have 
not the stability expected from a through-the-cycle rating.  
 The volatility of the structured finance ratings must be due to 
biased rating methodologies and to incentives to issue 
structured finance instruments. These incentives could led to 
moral hazard problems to generate enough underlyings.  
 
After we analyzed the US structured finance ratings behavior we want to 
compare the results with the European structured finance ratings. 
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3.2.2 Europe 
 
Figure 5: Based on calculations of S&P (2010) 
 
In Europe we should expect lower downgrade rates because of a lower 
structured finance issuance. The assumption is based on a less developed 
market for securitization and therewith a higher screening of the securitized 
underlying. Keys et al. (2009) gives an indication that high issuance of 
structured finance instruments could lead to less monitoring effort and lax 
screening. In contrast to the USA the 10% threshold seems to be too high, 
nevertheless the 10% burden was exceeded in both crises. After the “dot 
com” bubble we see high downgrade rates for EU CDOs and EU single-
name synthetics. The high downgrade rate for EU CDOs could be due to a 
high risk inherent in the underlying (maybe US structured finance 
instruments). There are no important downgrades for EU ABS which support 
the assumption that structured finance issuance is very restrictive and 
indicates a high underlying quality of the European assets. 
The downgrades after the subprime crisis show some differences to the US. 
We see the highest downgrade rate for EU CDOs with more than 40% 
downgrades. This rate is the third highest compared to US downgrades. 
Interestingly the downgrade rate for EU CMBS is nearly on the same level as 
for the US. Also the downgrades for EU single-name synthetics are in the 
range of the US values. The rise of the EU RMBS downgrades is due to lax 
screening in the Spanish mortgage market.  
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 The higher developed the structured finance market the higher is 
the range of structured finance instruments and the risk of lax 
screening of the underlying. 
 
Figure 6: Based on calculations of S&P (2010) 
 
European ABS performed well in the period 2000-2009. The EU CDOs and 
EU single-name synthetics show high rating volatility in both economic 
downturns. Remarkable is the amazing increase in downgrade rates for EU 
MBS. In the period 2000-2006 as in the USA nearly all European structured 
finance ratings give no indication for a financial crisis. 
 The relatively low downgrade rates compared to the US 
structured finance market are due to less investor confidence in 
structured finance products. 
  One reason for the low European structured finance issuance is 
the high developed Pfandbrief market and the investor 
confidence in this instrument.  
3.2.4 Structured finance ratings summary 
The low Gini coefficient for CDOs in the subprime crisis was a first indication 
that the structured finance rating methodology is wrong. Empirically this was 
supported by the huge downgrade rates for the US and European structured 
finance instruments. The structured finance ratings gave no indication for the 
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subprime crisis and reacted completely different compared to the „dot com“ 
bubble, which makes the development of an early warning system for 
financial crisis more complicated. Even in May 2007 Moody´s showed in their 
full-year 2006 report no expected changes for the securitization market 
(Moody´s (2007)). If we consider the enormous dependence of the banking 
system on ratings, financial stability is in danger if the banks´ dependence is 
high for structured finance instruments used for secondary market 
refinancing. Structured finance ratings react different compared to ratings of 
other asset classes. The European structured finance market seems to be 
more conservative and therewith gives an important indication that there 
have to be exogenous motivations for structured finance issuance. It is not 
just the simple completion of financial markets. Motivations like the decrease 
of regulatory capital, regulatory arbitrage or more general economic factors 
like monetary policy could have amplified the US structured finance issuance 
leading to the subprime crisis. 
Therefore we want to analyze the issuance and outstanding to find the main 
motivations for the crisis and could therewith evaluate actual regulatory 
enhancements. 
3.3 Structured finance issuance and outstanding 
In the last chapter we analyzed the rating performance and behavior. 
International banking regulation frameworks, like Basel II, use external 
ratings as a proxy for risk and therewith for the determination of regulatory 
capital. As a next step we want to analyze the structured finance issuance 
and outstanding. This is necessary to draw conclusions why structured 
finance instruments were issued. Afterwards we complete the findings to 
show motivations for securitization. 
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3.3.1 USA 
 
Figure 7: Based on calculations of SIFMA 
 
The US structured finance market is the most developed in the world and the 
most complex structured finance instruments were issued in the USA. The 
subprime crisis is primary based on US structured finance instruments that 
were traded and repackaged all around the globe. If we analyze the 
structured finance issuance in more detail we see clear differences.  
The US ABS issuance has a healthy growth rate between 1996 and 2003. 
The high increase between 2004 and mid 2007 is due to the economic 
recovery of the “dot com“ bubble and the investor acceptance of structured 
finance products. The growth in the ABS market did not lead to the 
international financial crisis. The reason is the diversified portfolio of ABS 
underlyings like leasing-, credit card- or student loan receivables.  
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Figure 8: Based on calculations of SIFMA 
 
The detailed US ABS Issuance figure shows normal growth rates for all 
securitized underlyings but home equity loans. The interaction of MBS, home 
equity loan ABS and resecuritisations amplified the granting of mortgages 
and home equity loans which became an important danger for financial 
market stability. Agarwal et al. (2006) noted that home equity loans are loans 
with home equity as collateral. The loans require a very good credit history 
and the magnitude of the loans is limited to the value of the home equity. It is 
often used as a short to mid term loan to finance major expenses like college 
education or home repair. The issuance of ABS with home equity collateral 
seems good protected against default risk because of the relevant credit 
history and the collateral itself. Amplified was the issuance also because of 
the rising real estate prices, e.g. the median sales prices of new homes sold 
in the US nearly doubled between 1995 and 2007 (Census (2010)).   
 The US ABS issuance has normal growth rates for nearly all 
instruments but home equity ABS. These structured finance 
instruments had no significant impact for the formation of the 
worldwide financial crisis. 
 The investor trust in home equity loan ABS amplified the 
issuance of home equity loans and home equity loan ABS in an 
unprecedented manner. The issued volume increased from $74.4 
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billion  in 2000 to $483,9 billion in 2006, i.e. a growth of more than 
650% in 6 years!  
 Due to the rising real estate prices the home owners with good 
credit history could get additionally to their mortgage a home 
equity loan. The rising US interest level led to increased defaults 
in home equity loans and therewith also in mortgages in the Alt-A 
and A scoring worsening the situation on the MBS market. 
 
Figure 9: Based on calculations of SIFMA 
 
If we have a look at the US mortgage-related structured finance issuance 
we see an important activity through US agencies. Even if the non-agency 
issuance nearly doubled between 2004 and 2005, which is clearly 
incompatible with an economic related growth rate, it must be primarily 
CMBS issuance, since the US agencies issued an enormous volume of 
RMBS. This thesis is supported because the downgrade rates of the CMBS 
are more resistant against economic fluctuations than RMBS. The dominant 
players in the agency sector were government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) 
like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Bank. Of course, 
one reason for the high issuance was the investor overreliance on high rated 
structured finance instruments. According to Holmes (1999) we believe that 
the main reason was the policy the GSE were restricted to through the US 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Since the early 
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1990s the HUD relaxed the conditions for the allocation of mortgage loans 
until in 2006 the HUD directed the GSEs that 56% of their loans have to be 
provided to borrowers with income below the median in their area. 
Additionally the HUD restricted that 12% of the GSEs mortgage financing 
have to be special affordable loans. These loans were provided to borrowers 
with an income less than 60% of their median´s income. The yearly agency 
MBS issuance was in the range of $440 billion. The peak was reached in 
2003 with an issued agency MBS volume of over $2.7 trillion.  
 
Figure 10: Based on calculations of SIFMA 
 
This led to an increasing outstanding volume of MBS with its peak in 2009 
with nearly $9.2 trillion. As noted before the ABS (beside of home equity 
loans) issuance and also the ABS outstanding have normal growth rates, 
beside of the fact that the difference increased over the years. The difference 
could be seen as indicator for systemic risk and possibly be integrated into 
early warning systems. Less structured finance issuance means that 
economic conditions dampened or the investors trust in structured finance 
instruments worsen. If there is additionally a high structured finance 
outstanding, the default probability could increase with not predictable effects 
to collateral default correlation and systemic risk observed in the subprime 
crisis. For the sake of completeness we see the ratio of structured finance 
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issuance and outstanding as indicator for repayment speed or revolving 
frequency. Even if the agency MBS issuance was worrisome the immense 
MBS outstanding is even more. The magnitude of $9.2 trillion MBS 
outstanding indicates that enormous positions must be held by investors all 
around the globe. It was grossly negligent from investors risk management to 
disregard these indicators and careless from the worldwide regulation 
authorities. 
 A main reason for the incredible growth rate in the MBS market 
was the policy driven MBS issuance by US GSEs with a 
maximum of $2.7 trillion. 
 A higher spread (outstanding vs. issuance) indicates less 
investor confidence and market uncertainty. 
 The issuance/outstanding ratio could be seen as indicator for the 
revolving speed of structured finance instruments. 
 The systemic risk due to US agency MBS issuance was grossly 
neglected by the worldwide supervision authorities and in the 
regulation frameworks. 
 
And even more dangerous the picture become if we see the enormous 
and disproportional issuance of US CDOs backed by structured finance 
instruments: $307.8 billion.  
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Figure 11: Based on calculations of SIFMA 
3.3.2 US structured finance issuance and outstanding summary 
 
Figure 12 
 
If we neglect for this chapter the question why financial institutions invested 
in structured finance instruments, we see clear differences in structured 
finance issuance. We can state that there is dependence between high 
issuance and high downgrades. This fact may be random for structured 
finance instruments but reveal the former noted rating methodology failures. 
According to that we could determine clear motivations for structured finance 
issuance, especially for mortgage related instruments. Due to the 
combination of low US interest rates, social policy, the economic recovery of 
the “dot com” bubble and the apparently unlimited demand for structured 
finance instruments, the mortgage supply also seems unlimited. Figure 10 
describe the interaction that leads to the crisis. Home equity loan ABS and 
RMBS were the main underlyings for CDOs (figure 9). If they stagger the 
CDOs also will stagger. The RMBS with subprime underlyings staggered as 
the FED increased the main interest rates. But for most of the high quality 
RMBS this increase was not dramatic. It became dramatic because 
additionally many people also had home equity loans. Due to that home 
equity loan ABS, bad and good quality RMBS and CDO² struggle and the 
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crisis was perfect. Together with important failures of the rating 
methodologies for structured finance instruments and the drying-out of the 
important interbank markets the world faced one of the biggest financial 
crises ever. 
As a consequence we could say that with a regulation of credit rating 
agencies, higher risk weights, better banking supervision on risk- and liquidity 
management and more intensive banking due diligence the crisis could have 
been prevented. Before we evaluate if the mentioned aspects are 
incorporated in actual regulatory enhancements or consultation papers, we 
want to analyze if the banking behavior was rational although the facts and 
failures were so obvious. 
4. Was banking behavior rational? 
The Bearingpoint securitization survey from December 2009 shows valuable 
insights into the motivation of securitization. Before the subprime crisis one 
main motivation was the control of assets on the balance sheet to release 
regulatory capital. It was also possible to gain regulatory arbitrage due to the 
change to the securitization framework. Other important reasons were better 
conditions compared to unsecured refinancing, risk transfer and the 
diversification of liquidity channels. We will support the study by some 
theoretical approaches. 
Due to structured finance issuance a bank had the advantage of possible 
regulatory gains, gains from securitization and the sale of the tranches, lower 
refinancing costs risk transfer and balance sheet flexibility. 
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Figure 13: from S&P (2010) 
 
 The first theoretical approach describes a cycle that explains the “originate-
to-distribute” behavior of banks and the nearly unlimited investor demand for 
structured finance instruments. If we have a look at the low default rates of 
speculative grade structured finance instruments before the subprime crisis 
in figure 11 and the enormous issuance due to nearly unlimited investor 
demand, it was rational on a micro-level to originate structured finance 
instruments. The reasons for the nearly unlimited investor demand for 
structured finance instruments will be explained later. Nevertheless the risk of 
a too capital market orientated refinancing strategy was neglected. The 
worldwide supervision authorities ignored that and underestimated the risks 
and complexity of structured finance instruments for banks and for the whole 
financial system. 
Especially the risk increased due to the high demand for securitizations 
because banks could not generate enough underlyings with their standard 
business procedures. The consequence was a reduction of bank lending 
standards. Kiff and Mills (2007) showed that securitization could lead to lax 
screening and less monitoring effort. Franke (2005) mentioned that beside 
the moral hazard problem also the danger for adverse selection rises. 
Together with the high motivation of hedge funds to invest in structured 
finance instruments a dangerous cycle started. But why had hedge funds and 
other market participants such a high demand for structured finance 
instruments? 
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Figure 14: “originate-to-distribute” securitization subprime cycle 
 
Cole, Feldberg and Lynch (2007) showed that hedge funds managed over 
$1.426 trillion in 2006. Since 1995 this was an incredible growth rate of more 
than 700%. From an economic point of view the growth of the hedge fund 
industry led to decreasing returns per fund. To reach the required returns 
hedge funds had to use higher leverage and invest in more risky financial 
instruments (Papademos (2007)). Therewith hedge funds bought non-
performing loans directly from banks, invested in junior structured finance 
pieces or bought mezzanine structured finance tranches and originated 
resecuritisations (CDO²). 
Bundesbank (1999) mentioned that the high demand for hedge funds is 
explainable because hedge funds have no investment restrictions and 
therewith complement the portfolio of institutional investors. The cycle ends 
with the shareholder of hedge funds: the institutional investors. So, banks are 
shareholder of hedge funds and expected high returns. Due to the enormous 
growth of the hedge fund industry the accepted risks increased. The hedge 
fund demand for structured finance instruments increased and banks 
generated enormous underlyings with less and less due diligence to fulfill the 
demand (figure 14). Amplified was the cycle with the high ratings of credit 
rating agencies that suggest default protection and cheap money due to low 
US interest rates. The behavior was rational to invest in hedge funds, to 
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originate structured finance instruments and to use more capital market 
orientated funding from a bank point of view. 
From a macro perspective this had to lead to a financial crisis. As the crisis 
occurred in 2007 the demand for structured finance instruments dried up, the 
banks had to provide liquidity facilities, fulfill margin calls and guarantee for 
the hedge fund losses which ended in a liquidity crunch. These systemic 
risks were predictable and a main failure of worldwide supervision and 
regulation authorities. The reasons for the drying-out are shown in the 
liquidity crunch cycle in figure 15. Banks relied to heavy on cheaper 
secondary market funding. As the subprime crisis started the ABCPs of the 
banks own conduits were bought by the originating banks to avoid the draw 
of liquidity facilities. As this was not enough the liquidity facilities were drawn 
which led to rating triggers and downgrades for the structured finance 
instruments and for the originating bank. Both traditional funding and 
secondary market funding got more expensive or temporary impossible 
leading to a liquidity crunch. The banks dependence on secondary market 
funding via structured finance instruments depends on the incorporation of 
future gains and losses. 
 
Figure 15: liquidity crunch based on too strong reliance on secondary market funding 
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To prevent future crises it is necessary that banks see the origination of 
structured finance instruments not as a one-time game that lead to moral 
hazard behavior. If they see the origination as an infinitely repeated game 
they also have to incorporate future gains and losses into their decision and 
will support financial stability with their more conservative behavior. In the 
actual discussion about banking regulation the regulator has to reduce the 
bank dependence on secondary market funding in a way that the cycle 
shown in figure 15 will not be critical for the liquidity positions of banks. As 
explained before the discount factor of future gains and losses influence the 
decision of banking behavior. Many banks struggled in the subprime crisis 
with liquidity problems which could easily be explained with game theory. 
 
Especially the uncertainty due to biased structured finance ratings led to a 
drying-out of the interbank market. The behavior of the banks could be easily 
explained with game theoretic approaches like the prisoner´s dilemma 
(Gibbons (1992)). 
       
Bank 1 (vertical axis) /Bank 2 
     lending            not lending 
ß, ß δ, α 
α, δ γ, γ 
 
with α > ß > γ > δ. 
figure 16: prisoners dilemma from Gibbons (1992).  
 
If there is high uncertainty in the interbank market banking group one and two 
play maximin strategies to prevent losses and reach the equilibrium (γ, γ). 
This “not lending” behavior lead to higher spreads and in extreme to a 
situation where all banks do this tradeoff. The result is a complete drying-out 
of the interbank market (Brunnermeier (2009)). This has already enormous 
consequences for systemic risk and financial stability but will be amplified if 
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this game is also played between banks and investors regarding commercial 
paper sales. If also the commercial paper market is close to a drying-out 
there is no other chance to prevent a collapse of the financial system with 
state guarantees and central bank initiatives. This phenomenon could be 
observed since the financial crisis 2007. 
Analyzing the banking behavior we could determine that banking behavior 
was rational on a micro-level and in short to mid-term. Three conclusions 
follow: it is important that banks´ dependence on secondary market liquidity 
and the regulatory disregarding of off-balance sheet positions are limited. 
Rating agencies should be regulated with an international framework to 
guarantee that the expected default probabilities are highly correlated with 
the realized defaults. All three aspects are very important to restore 
confidence in financial markets. Before we evaluate actual regulatory 
approaches regarding these aspects, we give a short introduction to banking 
regulation. 
5. Banking regulation and structured finance 
enhancements 
Financial market stability is very important for a growing real economy. But 
strong international competition, shadow banking and moral hazard behavior 
make financial markets more complex and interdependent. For prevention 
banking regulation is very important. 
Banking regulation restricts the financial markets and because of that every 
regulation initiative has to be well considered. Regulation is adequate if 
depositors and states are prevented from losses. It is important to 
understand that the goal of regulation is not to prevent losses in general, but 
to prevent moral hazard behavior. Bhattacharya et al. (1998) provides a good 
overview of regulation literature. Some aspects to highlight are the possibility 
for passive money creation which has direct effects to the money supply of 
an economy and to price stability. Some authors are of the opinion that the 
banking system has a tendency for instability. In this context keywords like 
“gambling for resurrection”, “too big to fail” or “lender of last resort” support 
the instability hypothesis especially if we look at the last three crises. 
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We have to question why the last three crises could not be prevented or at 
least led to lower defaults. One reason is the innovation speed. In the last 30 
years the technical possibilities and the international dependence increased 
with an amazing rate, leading to a stronger competition worldwide. The 
pressure for higher returns led to a lot of financial innovations like hedge 
funds or securitization that of course have positive effects for financial 
markets but could also lead to serious problems like the LTCM crash in 1998 
or the subprime crisis beginning in 2007. These new players and instruments 
are often not regulated or fall out of the existing regulatory framework. The 
key question is whether the structured finance instruments complete financial 
markets and rise financial market efficiency of if they just circumvent 
regulation and are moral hazard intended. Another problem is that the 
international regulation reacts heterogeneous and with a high time lag to 
these innovations. Regulation could lead to lower returns and so the banking 
system tries to circumvent the regulation. This is a normal profit maximizing 
behavior and not critical if the regulation authorities respond fast. But the last 
crisis showed that there were lots of problems that are not implemented in 
actual regulation frameworks (e.g. resecuritisations). First of all the regulatory 
structure pictures the state of three independent financial sectors: banks, 
securities firms and insurance companies. Even if there is the tendency to 
merge the three supervising authorities to one supervision authority on a 
national level (Masciandaro et al. (2009)), regulators find that their jurisdiction 
does not match the activities of the entities they are regulating.  
In 2009 and 2010 there was and still is enormous international political 
pressure to implement as soon as possible new regulation frameworks like 
the “European regulation on credit rating agencies”, “Basel II enhancements” 
or the  “Basel III consultation paper”. These enhancements and consultations 
are necessary but the danger is that proposals are discussed that were 
developed too fast. The whole Basel regulation was developed and 
implemented within 5-10 years. Of course there are failures that are obvious 
which could be corrected in a very simple way, but there are other 
interdependencies that are not seen today, leading to possible overregulation 
that did not prevent crises but have important consequences for economic 
growth. Especially the “Basel III consultation paper” have to be seen very 
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critical. Therefore we want to have a look at actual regulation consultation 
papers and evaluate it with respect to the findings of the last chapters.  
5.1 EU-regulation on credit rating agencies 
As noted before credit rating agencies (CRA) have a high systemic 
relevance. Therefore the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union passed the regulation (EC) No 1060 in September 2009 on 
CRA [EU 2009]. The regulation is based on the proposal of the Commission 
and the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
European Central Bank to guarantee credit ratings that are independent, 
objective and of adequate quality. We show you the main characteristics of 
the proposal. 
The regulation tries to prevent blind trust in credit ratings and to encourage 
the banks own due diligence procedures. There are explicit remarks that no 
financial institution should only invest in financial instruments that have a 
rating according to this regulation. 
If a prospectus is published for a security the prospectus should contain 
detailed information that the CRA is registered under this regulation. But this 
is a minimal requirement and should not prevent CRAs to offer more and 
detailed information about the security. So the CRAs have also self-interest 
in the short to mid-term to restore confidence and therewith stabilize their 
own business. To support this, the regulation suggests the CRAs to apply to 
the IOSCO Code. This voluntary suggestion is obligatory for the CRAS 
because the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) monitors 
the compliance with the IOSCO Code and report back to the Commission 
annually.  
In general the European Parliament wants to set quality standards and 
demarcate CRAs and ratings within the EU and provide additional 
requirements for CRAs and ratings in third countries. Ratings issued outside 
of the EU could also be used for regulatory purposes, but only if they comply 
with the requirements of the regulation 1060/2009. The CRA has to monitor if 
the ratings of this third country CRA are as stringent as those provided for the 
EU regulation. The effective monitoring should be guaranteed by the full and 
27 
 
unconditional responsibility for the credit ratings through the EU CRAs. More 
detailed information about the criteria that third country CRAs have to meet 
or the certification process, could be found in the regulation, but is over the 
scope of this paper. 
 
Basel (2009b) mentioned that the rating agencies had an incentive to 
produce good ratings and neglect cliff risks. To prevent this possibly 
dangerous behavior the CRA are not allowed to provide consultancy or 
advisory services. This means especially the recommendations for the 
architecture of structured finance instruments that could create potential 
conflicts of interest with the issuing of credit ratings.  
As shown in the second chapter the expected and realized structured finance 
defaults differ in a significant way. Basel (2009a,b) provide enhancements to 
the existing regulation framework to strengthen banks due diligence 
activities. Complementary this framework regulates that CRAs do their own 
due diligence. They should use rating methodologies that are rigorous, 
systematic, continuous and be subject to validation (back-testing). The 
issued ratings should be monitored and reviewed in frequent manner. Also 
CRAs have to provide now information about their rating methodologies and 
their changes (also mathematical or correlation assumptions) with an amount 
adequate for an investor to understand the credit ratings and to perform their 
own due diligence. Of course the disclosure should not contain sensitive 
business information, but ratings should be easily comparable between 
different CRAs. 
 If a rating could not fulfill the requirements due to a lack of reliable data or 
the complexity of the structure, the CRAs should not provide a credit rating or 
withdraw an existing credit rating. To rise transparency and disburden the 
investors due diligence CRAs should use own rating categories for structured 
finance instruments and mark them specially. 
To restore confidence in CRAs the CESR should maintain a central 
repository where information on the past performances of CRAs and 
information about credit ratings issued in the past should be kept. The CESR 
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should write an annual report and publish summarized information on the 
main CRA developments.  
To prevent moral hazard behavior the regulation prescribes intensive 
compliance policies. To avoid potential conflicts administrative board 
members should not get business dependent compensation. Analysts and 
other employees of CRAs should rotate to guarantee a gradual change in 
analytical teams and credit rating committees.  CRAs are subject to 
registration (CESR is receiving applications) in order to ensure a high level of 
investor and consumer confidence (additional to Directive 2006/48/EC).  
CESR subcommittees should be established for each asset class rated by 
CRAs to identify possible risks at an early stage. Also the CRAs were 
supervised by colleges like in the European banking supervision and should 
share on supranational base information with other European supervision 
authorities. The CESR should ensure coherence in the application of the 
regulation. Even if this regulation approach is a step in the right direction, the 
current supervisory structure should not be considered as a long-term 
solution. In order to achieve the necessary level of European supervisory 
convergence and cooperation we refer to the findings of the “De Larosiere 
Report (2009)”.  
The regulation on CRAs is in force since the mid of December 2009. Nearly 
all credit institutions have to use EU credit ratings for regulatory purposes. 
This regulation shall apply from 7 December 2010. If a registered CRA wants 
to endorse a rating from a third country, the CRA of the third country have to 
be registered and supervised in that country. Additionally the third country 
CRA have to be independent. The third country supervision authority has to 
ensure comprehensive cooperation arrangements. These regulations shall 
apply from 7 June 2011.  
The EU Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the 
Council the progress of this regulation application and the regulatory reliance 
on credit ratings. Also a report should be submitted to the European 
Parliament and to the Council to discuss alternative approaches to the 
`issuer pays´ model. One alternative is the creation of a public Community 
CRA. Concluding a report should be submitted assessing developments in 
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the regulatory and supervisory framework of third countries and evaluate the 
effects of those developments to the actual supervision framework and 
financial markets stability. 
Summarizing the regulation of CRAs is a step in the right direction and 
picked up the weaknesses showed in the third chapter. Maybe the subprime 
crisis could not have been avoided but at least attenuated. More supervision, 
transparency and disclosure covenants are necessary to regain investor 
confidence and strengthen financial stability. The EU regulation is in line with 
the new regulation of CRAs in the USA proposed by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Positive is the coordinating function of the 
CESR. It has ensured that the EU regulation is in line with the revised Basel 
frameworks for the recognition as external credit assessment institution 
(ECAI). One aspect is very critical: the non-providing of ratings for new 
financial instruments. If the historical data is not adequate ratings should not 
be provided. This is overregulation and prevents innovation and growth in the 
financial industry. We propose a new rating category for financial innovations 
which could be linked with higher risk weights. Then institutional investors 
could decide whether they want to invest in these new financial instruments.  
5.2 Basel II enhancements 
After we evaluated the regulation of CRAs, we want to have a look at the 
regulation initiatives of the Basel Committee. As a first reaction to the 
financial crisis the Basel Committee presented “Enhancements to the Basel II 
framework” (Basel 2009a) in July 2009. Banks should comply with the 
revised requirements by 31 December 2010. We summarize the main 
changes. 
In the actual credit risk securitisation framework is no differentiation between 
securitisations and resecuritisations under the IRB approach. So paragraph 
541 (i) was supplemented. Basel (2009a) defined that “even if only one of the 
underlying exposures is a securitisation exposure, any tranched position 
exposed to that pool is considered a resecuritisation exposure”. This is also 
in force for credit derivatives or ABCP programmes which is a debatable 
extension. As a result the resecuritisation exposures got own risk weights for 
the IRB approach that are higher than for standard securitisation exposures. 
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Based on the empirical work for the estimation of IRB resecuritisation risk 
weights also standardised approach (SA) resecuritisation risk weights were 
introduced. The SA risk weights are in the average of the risk weight bands 
for the IRB approach and in line with the philosophy of the standard Basel II 
approach. 
Another important safety net is margin calls. Ratings have direct 
consequences to rating triggers and are directly linked to reputational risk. 
Brunnermeier (2009) showed the liquidity drying-out in the last crisis. This 
drying-out was an enormous problem for many conduits that refinanced their 
exposures via short term ABCP programmes. Instead of drawing the conduits 
liquidity facility the originating bank decided to buy by itself the ABCPs and 
paradoxical availed from that opportunity. Basel (2009a) noted that the bank 
“benefited from the external rating on the commercial paper when assigning 
a risk weight to that paper, even though the rating was due in large part to 
the bank´s own support of the conduit in the form of the liquidity facility”. 
Banks should not benefit any more from lower risk weights due to self 
guarantees because there is no additional support that legitimate that lower 
minimal capital requirements, i.e. just regulatory arbitrage. The Basel 
Committee added therefore paragraph 565(g)(i), 565(g)(ii) and 565(g)(iii). 
As shown before the banks securitisation due diligence was fragmentary. 
Now banks have to verify their understanding of their securitisation 
exposures. Basel (2009a) added the paragraphs 565 (i,ii,iii,iv) and limited the 
use of the securitisation framework to banks that provide key risk data  for 
off-and on balance sheet securitisation exposures. On one hand detailed 
information like default rates, prepayment rates, ltv, or geographic 
diversification are needed. On the other hand also structural information has 
to be provided like waterfall-related triggers or credit enhancements. The 
parameters must also be collected for the original underlying exposures of 
resecuritisations to better estimate the risk characteristics of complex 
structured finance instruments. 
To estimate the EAD for traditional off-balance sheet commitments a credit 
conversion factor (CCF) is needed. For short/long term commitments the 
CCF is 20% / 50%. This was also the case for securitisation commitments 
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like liquidity facilities. Now the paragraph 579 was changed so that for short 
and long term facilities the CCF is 50%. This is valid for the SA. If a bank 
uses the IRB approach liquidity facilities are treated as any other 
securitisation exposure and receive a CCF of 100%. As noted before the 
bank could also use an external rating for a liquidity facility if it is no self 
guarantee. Basel (2009a) mentioned that most of the guarantees have no 
rating. The bank then has to apply either the IAA or the SFA if the necessary 
data is available or has to deduct it completely. Additional explanations were 
added to paragraph 613 (c) as clarification. In the Basel II framework 
guarantees that could be drawn only in the case of market disruptions were 
preferred with a 0% CCF under the SA securitisation framework or 20% 
under the SFA in the IRB securitisation framework. Paragraph 580 and 638 
were eliminated.  
 
Summarizing the rest of the enhancements there were also changes to Pillar 
2 and Pillar 3 guidance. As noted in Basel (2009a) Pillar 1 capital 
requirements are minimum requirements and should be supplemented with 
Pillar 2 capital support to strengthen banks against unanticipated shocks. 
Additionally there were also lots of changes to banks risk management 
procedures in the supervisory review process and disclosure requirements in 
the context of securitisation that are over the scope of this paper. Obvious 
failures occurred by the development of Basel II, shown trough the subprime 
crisis, were corrected. The enhancements are necessary and not disputable. 
They will prevent possible cycles like shown in figure 12 but will not affect the 
standard structured finance issuance. The enormous policy pressure to 
develop more rigorous banking supervision frameworks is dangerous. In the 
subprime crisis regulatory faults were used to create regulatory gains. This 
was still possible despite the long development time of Basel II. Therefore 
actual regulatory consultation papers have to be considered and evaluated 
carefully. 
5.3 Basel III consultation paper 
After the financial crisis begun in mid 2007 the Basel Committee started to 
develop a comprehensive reform package. The enhancements to the existing 
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Basel II framework and the actual consultation paper are set up in 
coordination with the developments endorsed by the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) and the G20 leaders. BIS (2009b) mentioned that the proposed 
introduction of these regulatory enhancements will be implemented by end 
2012. This is very fast if we see the development time of Basel II. Hopefully 
the proposed changes are based on empirical evidence and not only on 
political pressure. 
As noted in BIS (2009b) the consultative document presents the Basel 
Committee´s proposals to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations 
with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector. One main goal is 
to make the financial system more shock resistant and to prevent systemic 
important crises. But also risk management procedures and supranational 
supervisory structures were discussed.  
BIS (2009b) summarized the main problems of the financial crisis. Many 
banks in many countries had built up excessive on- and off-balance sheet 
leverage. This was amplified by a worsening quality of the capital base and 
insufficient liquidity buffers. As described before in the game theoretic 
interbank market approach, the market loss confidence in the solvency and 
liquidity of many banking institutions. This resulted in a unique bail-out from 
public sectors worldwide and large spillovers to the real economy that have 
to be prevented in the future.  
BIS (2009b) abstract the five important areas of change to the Basel II 
framework that are in consultation.  
1.) The quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base will be 
raised. 
2.) The risk coverage of the capital framework will be strengthened. As 
showed before in BIS (2009a) for the risk coverage from trading book 
and securitization exposures. 
3.) Introduction of a leverage-ratio. 
4.) Introduction of a series of measures to promote the build up of capital 
buffers in good times to reduce the existing Basel II procyclical 
behavior. 
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5.) A 30-day liquidity coverage ratio and a longer-term structural liquidity 
ratio will be introduced to guarantee a global minimum liquidity 
standard.   
After we introduced the main areas of regulatory changes we want to go now 
a step further and evaluate the approaches regarding structured finance 
instruments. 
To strengthen the quality of tier 1/2 capital to absorb losses, certain 
securitization exposures which are currently deducted 50% from Tier 1 and 
50% from Tier 2 should receive a 1250% risk weight. BIS (2009b) mentioned 
that the advantage of this regulation is a more transparent and easier 
definition of capital, particularly in the application of limits. 
 Securitization exposures should not be implemented in Tier 1/2 capital 
to absorb losses though a 1250% risk weight. This is adequate and 
should have been done with the implementation of Basel II.  
To address counterparty credit risk in a better way BIS (2009b) promotes 
the approach to “create a separate supervisory haircut category for repo-
style transactions using securitization collateral and prohibit 
resecuritisations as eligible financial collateral for regulatory capital 
treatment purposes” 
 The crisis showed that structured finance instruments react in another 
way to financial distress as for example standard debt instruments, 
e.g. structured finance instruments have much higher price volatility. 
Many reasons could be found like wrong rating methodologies, less 
due diligence, lax screening of underlyings and the waterfall payment 
structure. Therefore the creation of a separate supervisory haircut 
category for repo-style transactions using securitization collateral is 
essential. The crisis showed a drying-out for important markets of 
resecuritised financial instruments. Resecuritisations are even more 
unpredictable and so they should not serve as financial collateral. A 
concluding evaluation is not possible as we do not know the extent of 
the new haircut category. 
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 This new rule is specified for the supervisory haircuts method, the own 
estimates of haircut method, the repo VaR method and the internal 
model method in a new paragraph 145 (i) in the Basel text. 
In addition, the Committee is proposing also a separate supervisory haircut 
category for securitization exposures. The new haircuts would double the 
corporate debt haircuts. 
 In the beginning of the subchapter the BIS (2009b) noted that these 
proposals are grounded in observations from the crisis, empirical work 
and industry surveys. Nevertheless the simple doubling of haircuts is 
not traceable and even if the tendency of the haircut rising is alright, 
the extent is questionable. Formally this change resulted in a revised 
version of paragraph 151. 
Additionally Basel (2009b) mentioned that the Committee is reviewing the 
revised securitization framework. Again the basic question is whether these 
products complement financial markets or if they were moral hazard intended 
to gain regulatory arbitrage. The former Basel II framework invited the banks 
to play a “one-period” game, to disregard the necessary due diligence and to 
neglect the possible future development of systemic risk. The rating agencies 
had an incentive to produce good ratings. Banks had therewith a lower 
minimum capital requirement and more possibilities how to deal with these 
structured finance exposures. The same risk existed for cliff effects.  
Basel (2009b) noted that two possible extreme approaches are conceivable 
now. The first approach would be a risk insensitive weight (like Basel I), 
which is clearly not desirable. The other approach would be the use of bank 
internal models to derive estimates like LGD or PD. It is the wrong way 
because a single bank does not have enough data (quantitative and 
qualitative) to provide strong estimates for these regulatory important ratios. 
One discussed alternative is the introduction of a leverage ratio. As noted in 
Basel (2009b) the Basel Committee announced in 2009 its intention to 
introduce a leverage ratio. It is in consultation if it will be a supplemental Tier 
2 ratio or a hard Tier 1 ratio. The basic idea of a leverage ratio is to constrain 
leverage with the intention to stabilize the financial system. It is defined in 
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Basel (2009b) as a “simple, non-risk-based “backstop” measure based on 
gross exposure”. Frenkel and Rudolf (2010) formalized the proposed Basel II 
leverage ratio = total assets/Tier 1 capital. The design of the leverage ratio 
consists of high quality capital, which should be measured with international 
accounting standards (also for securitization exposures). Additionally 
collateral could not reduce on-balance sheet exposures and netting is not 
allowed. Especially in the context of this paper the following elements are 
interesting: off-balance sheet items get a flat 100% CCF and written credit 
protection is included at notional value (Basel (2009b)). 
As shown earlier in this paper enhancements of the existing regulatory 
framework are without question necessary. Approaches like the introduction 
of a leverage ratio are enhancements in the wrong direction. First of all the 
basic idea of Basel II is risk-dependent regulatory capital. With a “simple, 
non-risk-based” leverage ratio the Basel II principle is lead ad absurdum and 
guarantees just little protection against future crises. The performance of the 
early warning systems and the analysis of the stylized structured finance 
facts clarified that every crisis is different and that the moral hazard behavior 
of the subprime crisis has impulsive exogenous factors. The introduction of a 
leverage ratio which will not prevent future crises but has important negative 
consequences for the world economy. Frenkel and Rudolf (2010) estimated 
additional capital requirement by €85 billion for the German economy. This 
could lead to a reduction in lending in the range of €1.7 trillion and has 
important consequences for economic growth. The American Securitization 
Forum (ASF (2010)) estimates 15 times higher capital costs with the 
introduction of a leverage ratio. Standard & Poors (2009) expects further 
capital requirements in the range of €300 billion. Especially because a 
leverage ratio is a “simple, non-risk-based” measure it would reduce the risk 
sensitivity of the banking systems and fails to reduce financial instability. 
Frenkel and Rudolf (2010) mentioned that it is unrealistic to increase the 
required equity in the short term. As a compromise the Basel Committee 
should think about partial ratios that measure for example the dependence 
on capital marked based refinancing or about higher risk weights if certain 
thresholds are exceeded. Other ratios like  the balance sheet duration of 
possible securitization assets or a ratio for off-balance sheet positions are 
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also conceivable. Without question the banking systems needs a higher level 
of equity but to constrain banks with a leverage ratio is the wrong way and 
dangerous for worldwide economic growth.  
6. Summary 
In 2007 the world faced one of the biggest financial crises ever. It was the 
third important financial crisis in the last 12 years. Spillovers to the real 
economy and moral hazard behaviour of carpetbaggers resulted in enormous 
pressure on worldwide political institutions to approve a more rigorous 
regulation on financial institutions and predict financial crises via early 
warning systems. As shown in chapter two the development of an early 
warning system is still elusive and most models did not incorporate structured 
finance indicators. We showed that every financial crisis is different and 
analyzed the behaviour of structured finance ratings and structured finance 
issuance and outstanding in detail. Failures in rating methodologies are 
evidently and most of the structured finance instruments had normal growth 
rates. The combination and supply of home equity loan ABS, RMBS and 
CDO² based on structured finance instruments are one important catalyst of 
the subprime crisis and mainly driven by exogenous factors like low US 
interest rates, social policy and failures in Basel II. Afterwards we showed 
that banking behaviour was rational on a micro-level but must lead to a 
systemic crisis on a macro-level tightening with the drying-out of the liquidity 
markets. We found evidence in the Bearingpoint securitization survey (2009) 
and in two theoretical approaches shown in figures 14 and 15. As conclusion 
we see three important areas for regulatory changes. The bank dependence 
on secondary market funding must be limited and measured. Off-balance 
sheet positions must be supervised and could not be Tier 1 capital any more. 
CRAs have to be regulated to restore confidence in financial markets and to 
raise the reliance on ratings used for regulatory purposes. With this 
background we evaluated three important regulatory approaches. The EU 
regulation of CRAs acts on our topics and is a step in the right direction if it is 
implemented with international coordination. Nevertheless we see the non-
providing of ratings for financial instruments with a low historical database as 
critical and propose a separate rating category for new financial instruments 
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together with higher Basel II risk weights. The Basel II enhancements from 
July 2009 were a first reaction to the crisis and solved the main regulatory 
problems shown in the subprime crisis. With discomfort we evaluated some 
aspects of the Basel III consultation paper. Many aspects are disputable and 
are in the right direction, but the introduction of a leverage ratio is false. Of 
course, the banking system needs a higher level of equity but this goal 
should not be achieved via a leverage ratio. A leverage ratio has significant 
impact for the worldwide economies and will reduce economic growth for 
years. Additionally, a risk insensitive leverage ratio will not prevent financial 
crises and animate banks to have higher risks on their balance sheet. As a 
compromise we propose partial ratios that measure for example the 
dependence on capital marked based refinancing (like a liquidity ratio), the 
balance sheet duration of possible securitization assets or a ratio for off-
balance sheet positions. 
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